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Abstract: Assuming some fixed cost to information acquisition, diffuse shareholders in publicly held
firms have little incentive to produce information that can substitute for the services of financial
analysts. However, we argue that concentrated shareholdings, either by outsiders like institutions or
by inside managers, reduce the demand for analyst services. The former group finds it worthwhile to
produce its own information and avoid any moral hazard problems associated with analyst forecasts,
while the concentration of shareholdings by insiders reduces the moral hazard problem associated with
outside claimants (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and may work as an independent signal of quality (Leland
and Pyle 1977). Earlier authors have provided evidence that the number of analysts following a firm is
associated with the distribution of shareholdings between institutions, insiders, and other shareholders.
In this paper we provide evidence that, after controlling for any average distributional effects, increased
concentration of shareholdings by either insiders or outsiders (like institutions) is associated with lower
analyst following. The results are robust to alternative measures of concentration and the definition of
outside shareholders.
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Concentrated Shareholdings and the Number of Outside Analysts
1. Introduction
The typical investor has a small stake in a given firm and therefore has little incentive,
given even small fixed costs, to produce independent information concerning the firm’s prospects
or monitor managers. Thus, these investors get most of their information from either
management or outside analysts. Indeed, as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976), one of the
socially valuable roles of analysts may lie in mitigating moral hazard problems between insiders
and outside claimants. Thus, the demand for financial analysts may depend on the composition
of outside shareholders and the distribution of shares between insiders and disparate groups of
outsiders.
         Earlier authors (see, e.g., Bhushan (1989), Moyer, Chatfield and Sisneros (1989)) have
in fact provided evidence that the number of analysts following a given firm is inversely related to
the percentage of the firm held by insiders and positively related to measures of institutional
shareholdings including the percentage holdings of institutional investors and/or the number of
institutional investors. These authors argue that the insider relationship can be attributed to lower
moral hazard costs when insiders collectively hold a higher stake in the firm. The relationship
between analyst following and institutional holdings comes from the idea that, unlike individual
investors, sophisticated institutions will, other things the same, demand more professionally
generated third party information concerning the firm’s prospects. More generally, one could
argue that analyst following may increase or decrease, depending on how shares are allocated,
on average, across groups of investors.
         Our contribution to this literature involves our argument that the demand for analyst
services will, for a given distribution of shares between outsiders and insiders, be inversely
related to the concentration of shareholdings, regardless of the source. This hypothesis follows
from the fact that, should senior managers hold large stakes in the firm, there is a greater4
likelihood that managerial incentives will be aligned with those of other shareholders. Moreover,
if a given outsider has a large enough stake in the firm, it will at some point find it in its interest to
produce its own in-house information and avoid both the cost and moral hazard problems
associated with this third party producer of information (Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and
Thakor (1984)). These large outside stakeholders, like institutions, may in some instances also
act as a stand-in for controlling moral hazard and thus benefit small shareholders (Shliefer and
Vishny (1986)). For these reasons, our primary hypothesis is that analyst following is inversely
related to the concentration of holdings by both insiders and outsiders.
Our hypothesis concerning concentration and analyst following is not inconsistent with
existing evidence concerning analyst following and the distribution of shareholding. As noted
earlier, prior studies by Bhushan (1989) and Moyer et al. (1989) focus on the total percentage of
institutional or insider holding. We extend these studies by investigating how the concentration of
holdings are associated with analyst following. For reasons cited earlier, we argue that this
distribution of holdings is important, with more concentrated holdings being negatively
associated, ceteris paribus, with analyst following.
We empirically test this hypothesis by using a random sample of 1,178 firms for the year
1995. We find that, using a variety of alternative measures for concentration of ownership, the
number of analysts following the firm declines as concentration of ownership on the part of either
insiders or outsiders increases. In the case of insiders we find, for example, a significant
negative relationship between the number of analysts following a firm and the Herfindahl index of
insider ownership concentration.  As we explain in detail later, due to the type of ownership data
that is available, we can not construct the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration for all
outside stockholders. However, it is possible to construct the Herfindahl index of ownership
concentration specifically for outside institutional stockholders. Therefore, we employ this
measure and find a significant negative relationship between the number of analysts following a5
firm and the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership concentration.
1 Further, we look at the
blockholdings of all outside shareholders (institutions and individuals) as another measure of
outside ownership concentration and find similar results.
2 The results are robust across two
alternative specifications of outside blockholdings, including the number of blockholders and the
total percentage of shares held by these blockholders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the issues and
hypotheses in more detail. Section 3 describes the sample, the variables, and descriptive
statistics for the data. In section 4, we specify the empirical models and discuss the results. The
final section provides concluding comments.
2. Issues and hypotheses
         The main objective of this paper is to address whether the presence of concentrated
ownership is associated with less information production by third parties; in this case outside
analysts. We briefly present our arguments for the relationship between analyst following and
concentrated holdings by outsiders. We then discuss our hypothesis regarding the concentration
of holdings by insiders and analyst following.
2.1 Concentrated Holdings by Outsiders and the Number of Analysts
         As noted in the introduction, we argue that concentration of outside shareholdings
influences analyst following. This conjecture could be justified by a number of papers in the
theoretical literature, but the discussion in this section draws on the model in Diamond (1984). In
particular, he builds a model in which multiple outsiders lend to an entrepreneur in the presence
                                                       
1 In addition to the Herfindahl index, we examine the ownership of the top one and the top five insiders and
institutional shareholders with the largest holdings in a firm. We find that the results are robust to this
alternative specification of concentration.
2 A blockholder is defined as an owner of a beneficial interest of five percent or more of a firm's outstanding
shares. This percentage represents a significant investment on the part of a single investor and the SEC
requires the filing of a special report (Form 13D) upon the acquisition of five percent or more of the firm’s
shares.6
of asymmetric information. This leads to incentive problems and a decision by outsiders to either
each pay a fixed cost to produce information to monitor the entrepreneur themselves or to
delegate the monitoring task to an intermediary. While Diamond discussed the demand for
intermediary services by lenders, the analysis extends to the case in which the principals are
outside security holders of the firm. Specifically, in the context of our paper, outside shareholders
can be considered as the principals. They are concerned with whether to produce information to
monitor the firm’s management themselves or to delegate it to outside agents, in this case
financial analysts.
3
         Viewing analysts as information intermediaries is also consistent with the analysis of
Jensen and Meckling (1976), who suggest that security analysis activities could reduce agency
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control as well as with the work by
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), who model diversified information brokers such as Standard
& Poor’s, Value Line, Moody’s credit bureau, and consultants as financial intermediaries. These
intermediaries acquire and process information, and their output is information. Similarly,
financial analysts could also be considered information intermediaries and the theory of financial
intermediation could be applied to the relationship between outside holdings and analyst
following.
         Offsetting the incentive by an outsider to not pay the fixed cost and thereby delegate
monitoring to analysts are the well known incentive problems with intermediaries or information
producers in general. In this case, the conflict may arise from the fact that analysts not only
provide research services but also help the firms employing them in attracting business for other
services offered by the intermediary (such as underwriting). An analyst trying to attract
underwriting business may be motivated to provide more positive information about the issuing
firms. For example, La Porta (1996) and Rajan and Servaes (1997) indicate that firms with
                                                       
3 In a cover story (May 18, 1987), Business Week highlighted several instances of monitoring by
institutions and large shareholders.7
highest analysts’ forecasts of long-term growth in earnings have the lowest subsequent stock
price performance. Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1996) suggest that the possible motivation for
this is analysts’ incentives to provide more optimistic information about their underwriting clients.
4
Thus, considering the fixed costs of information production and the possible incentive
problems between shareholders and analysts, we argue that a higher concentration of
institutional shareholdings makes it likely that the institutional owners will produce information
themselves rather than delegating the task to analysts.
2.2 Concentrated Holdings by Insiders and the Number of Analysts
         Earlier findings by Bhushan (1989) and Moyer et al. (1989) suggest that analyst following
declines as the average percentage of the firm held by insiders increases. Insiders have ready
access to non-public information and do not depend on analysts to provide them information
about their firm. As insider holdings increase, holdings of noninsiders decline. Consequently,
they argue that the holdings of those who might need analyst services decline. These ideas are
consistent with agency cost argument presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They argue
that as management ownership rises, the managers are less likely to indulge in non-value
maximizing objectives. So, the information needs of outside stockholders decline.
         A similar result could be generated by the signaling model in Leland and Pyle (1977),
who argue that increased shareholdings by managers provide a positive signal to the market
concerning firm value, which again reduces the need for outside information. Indeed, it is
precisely because risk averse insiders have less than fully diversified portfolios, or have
“concentrated”  holdings in their  firm,  that  provides  the positive signal  concerning  value in the
                                                       
4 The business press provides some evidence regarding the existence of such behavior. For example, see
the Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1996, Some stock analysts are finding themselves in great demand and in
the land of big bucks. This article mentions that “…Many firms will also compensate analysts for their help
in attracting new stock issues…Of course, some money managers grumble that the big emphasis on new-
issue fees taints the research results if analysts try to avoid saying anything negative about their
underwriting clients…”.8
Leland and Pyle model. However, with multiple managers, the average shareholdings of insiders
may not provide a sufficient statistic for determining how incentive problems change as the
distribution of shareholdings between insiders and outsiders changes. One could imagine, for
example, a situation where the total holdings by insiders is large, but each individual insider
owns a small share of the firm and, therefore, may have an objective function that is inconsistent
with value maximization. By focusing on the effects of the concentration of insider holdings on
analyst following, we are able to more clearly test the hypotheses in Jensen and Meckling (1976)
and Leland and Pyle (1977) that insider holdings are associated with a lower demand for outside
information; in this case the demand for analysts.
        In summary, our main hypothesis is that the number of analysts following a firm will,
ceteris paribus, be negatively related to the concentration of ownership, be it by insiders or
outsiders. Before proceeding to the data, we first review some of the alternative measures of
concentration to be used for the purpose of testing the robustness of our results. We then
discuss some of the control variables to be employed in the empirical tests.
2.3 Alternative and Control variables
Measures of concentration
  Our main proxy for the concentration of shareholdings is the Herfindahl index of
institutional investor holdings (representing the vast majority of large outside shareholders) and a
similar Herfindahl index for holdings by insiders. The two Herfindahl index values are calculated
by summing the squared percentage of shares controlled by the five institutions and the five
insiders, respectively, with the largest holdings in the firm. We are constrained by the data to use
the holdings of the top five institutional shareholders instead of the top five outsiders, in general,
who may include institutional as well as individual shareholders. Ownership data is reported only
for those investors who belong to one or more of the following: categories: institution, insider, or
blockholder. Thus, we do not know if any of the top five outsiders is an individual. However, the9
Herfindahl index based on institutional holdings is likely to be a fair representation of
concentration of outside shareholdings since the majority of large outside shareholders are
institutions.
As a check on the robustness of our results, we also employ some other measures of
concentration that have been used in the literature. One of these measures is simply the
percentage of the firm held by institutions and insiders with the largest holdings of shares in the
firm.
5  We also use an alternative proxy for concentration of outside holdings, which is not limited
to institutional shareholders and includes individual outsiders as well. This proxy is the
percentage of the firm held by outsider blockholders, where a blockholder is defined as an
individual or group owning more than five percent of a firm's outstanding shares.
6
 Control variables
         In our empirical tests, we attempt to control for other variables that may be associated
with determining the number of analysts following a given firm. In this section we draw on earlier
work to explain why these control variables make sense in the context of our tests.
                                                       
5 Studies that analyze issues of ownership by large shareholders include Shliefer and Vishny (1986) and
Agrawal and Mandelker (1990). Shliefer and Vishny develop a model of corporate control according to
which the value of the firm increases with an increase in the ownership of the largest shareholder. Agrawal
and Mandelker examine the role of large shareholders in monitoring managers when they propose
antitakeover charter amendments. They analyze several measures of institutional ownership concentration,
including the percentages owned by the one, two, and five institutions with the largest holdings in a firm.
Their results suggest that a higher percentage of ownership by the largest institutional owners would result
in better monitoring.
6 Two relevant studies that discuss five-percent blockholdings are McConnell and Servaes (1990) and
Brous and Kini (1994). McConnell and Servaes do not find a significant relationship between corporate
value and blockholdings. They suggest that the lack of the relationship may be because they do not
distinguish among the different types of blockholders, and some blockholders, such as those related to the
corporate founder, may be passive investors. Brous and Kini study the monitoring role of institutional
owners by relating the level of institutional ownership to stock market returns in periods where
announcements of equity issues take place. They acknowledge that institutional blockholders may be
effective monitors, but do not explore this issue further.10
Firm size
Previous studies that have focused on institutional holdings, probably the largest
potential group of concentrated outside shareholdings, and analyst following (Bhushan, 1989;
Moyer, et al., 1989; Chung et al., 1995; Chung and Jo, 1996) have found a positive relation
between firm size and analyst following. These authors argue that there is a greater demand for
information about large firms since the aggregate potential gains to investors from having access
to better information are higher for these firms. Ceteris paribus, greater demand for information
about larger firms would result in greater demand for analysts.
7 Accordingly, we expect a positive
relation between size and analyst following.
Leverage
         Following Moyer et al. (1989), we control for the proportion of debt financing used in a
firm’s capital structure. Based on the potential agency cost argument, Moyer et al. (1989)
suggest that a higher debt ratio implies lower managerial discretion over free cash flows, thereby
reducing the need for externally generated information. Thus, we expect a negative relationship
between debt financing and analyst following.
Return variability
         Some previous studies have examined the effect of variability of firm’s returns on analyst
following. The results have been mixed. For example, Bhushan (1989) finds a significant positive
relationship while O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) find a significant negative relationship between
the variability of returns and analyst following.
8 These mixed results could be due to two opposite
effects of return variability on analyst following. On the one hand, since the value of information
about a more volatile firm is higher, the demand for information about such firms would be
                                                       
7 Since analysts have greater incentives to follow large firms, aggregate supply is also likely to be higher.
8 Moyer et al. (1989) employ annual earnings per share volatility over a five-year period as a measure of
firm volatility. They find a positive but insignificant relationship between analyst following and volatility.11
greater and analysts would have greater incentives to follow them. Thus, analyst following is
likely to be a positive function of return variability. On the other hand, if the cost of information
acquisition increases substantially as uncertainty increases, analyst following may turn out to be
inversely related to return volatility measures. Regardless of which effect dominates, we will
attempt to control for this source of risk by employing a proxy for return variability.
Correlation between firm and market returns
         Bhushan (1989) argues that for a given level of information costs relating to macro
variables, the marginal information acquisition cost will be lower if the correlation between firm
and market returns is higher. Accordingly, we control for the correlation between firm return and
market return, and expect a positive relationship between our proxy and the number of analysts.
Firm diversification
         Following Bhushan (1989) and Ferris and Sarin (1996), we control for the extent of
diversification of the firm. Greater difficulty and increased costs associated with information
acquisition for diversified firms are likely to result in a reduced level of following by analysts. On
the other hand, if there is a greater need for information concerning more diversified firms, then
the demand for analyst following could be higher for such firms. Thus, the effect of firm
diversification on analyst following is not obvious.
Number of shares outstanding
         O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) argue that analyst following is likely to increase with an
increase in the number of shares outstanding. The number of shares outstanding is a proxy for
the size of the potential investor base, and therefore the benefits of analyst information should
be greater for firms with a higher number of shares outstanding.12
Number of institutional stockholders
         Bhushan (1989) finds a positive relationship between analyst following and number of
institutional owners, and suggests that this result could be interpreted as greater demand for and
supply of analysts for firms with more institutional owners. Accordingly, we control for the number
of institutions holding the firm's stock.
Industry effects
It is likely that the costs of information acquisition are lower for firms in certain industries.
It is also likely that there is higher demand for information about firms belonging to certain
industries. For example, Moyer et al. (1989) argue that due to deposit insurance, banks and
savings institutions may adopt more risky strategies, and investors may demand more
information to monitor the management of these firms. Therefore, we also control for industry
effects by including dummy variables in the regressions.
3. Sample design and data description
3.1 Data sources
         Ownership data are obtained from the Disclosure database. This database provides
detailed institutional, insider, and five-percent beneficial ownership data. The ownership data in
the Disclosure database is the same as the ownership data gathered from SEC filings and
published by CDA/Spectrum. The number of analysts following a firm is obtained from the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) data included in the Disclosure database. The
data regarding firm characteristics, including size, leverage and the degree of diversification, are
also obtained from the Disclosure database. The Center for Research in Security Prices at the
University of Chicago (CRSP) tapes are used to obtain the data regarding firm and market
returns.13
3.2 Sample construction
         Table 1 provides some details of the sample selection procedure. The sample is
constructed for the year 1995. To be included in the sample, firms had to have data available on
Disclosure and I/B/E/S databases, as well as on CRSP tapes. Only firms with a financial year
ending on December 31 are included in the sample. We exclude any firm with missing ownership
data for institutions and insiders or for one or more control variables. Only firms followed by more
than one analyst are included in the sample.
9
3.3 Description of variables
We measure the number of analysts that follow a firm as those who provided forecasts
for the firm’s earnings per share for the 1995 financial year on June 15, 1995 (NAL). Since only
those firms whose financial year ends in the fourth quarter are included, these forecasts are
approximately two-quarters-ahead forecasts. The data regarding the number of analysts that
provided forecasts for the firm’s earnings per share for 1996 on June 15, 1995, are also
collected. There is no significant difference between the number of analysts providing forecasts
for the years 1995 and 1996, and the results reported in this paper are based on the number of
analysts who provided forecasts for the firm’s earnings per share for the 1995 financial year.
We measure the concentration of insider and outside shareholdings using the Herfindahl
index of ownership concentration. This measure has been used in earlier studies such as
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). We construct the Herfindahl index of insider ownership concentration
by summing the squared percentage ownership of the five insiders with the largest
shareholdings in that firm. The ownership data is reported only for those investors who are either
an institution, an insider, or a blockholder, implying that the stockholdings of noninsiders with
                                                       
9 An earlier version of this paper examined issues related to dispersion of analyst opinion. Consistent with
other studies such as Chung et al. (1995) and Chung and Jo (1996), only those firms that are followed by
at least two analysts are included so that the dispersion of analyst opinion could be measured for each
sample firm.14
less than five percent holdings are not reported unless the owner is an institution. Thus, it is not
possible to construct the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration for outsiders, in general,
since it is possible that one or more of the top five outside shareholders is neither an institution
nor a blockholder. We are therefore constrained to use the Herfindahl index of institutional
investor holdings. Since the majority of large shareholders are institutions, this measure is likely
to be a fair representation of concentration of outside shareholdings.
As an alternative measure of concentration by outsiders, we use the blockholdings of
these shareholders. This measure offers the advantage of accounting for any blockholdings by
non-institutional outsiders. To construct this measure, we start with blockholdings based on the
SEC filing procedures, which define a blockholder as a direct owner of a beneficial interest of five
percent or more of a firm's outstanding shares. Several studies, including Agrawal and
Mandelker (1990), Bethel et al. (1998), and McConnell and Servaes (1990), have used this
definition. However, some of the blockholders, as defined by the SEC, reflect insider interests.
Therefore, as in Bethel et al. (1998), we exclude from the blockholdings any owners who are
directors or officers of the firm. We also eliminate all those blockholders who have the same last
names as any of the officers or directors. Thus, the variable PERBLOCK represents the
percentage of the firm’s shares owned by the noninsider five-percent blockholders. NUMBLOCK
is the number of these noninsider five-percent blockholders.
The size of the firm is measured as the natural log of the market value of firm's equity
(LMVE). A proxy for the extent of debt financing used by the firm is given by the ratio of long
term debt to equity (DEBT). The extent of diversification of a firm is measured by the number of
its four-digit SIC codes (CODES). The variability of a firm’s return is measured by the variance of
daily returns of the firm during the year 1994 (RETVAR).
10 The correlation between firm and
market returns is measured by the coefficient of determination of the above regression (RSQ).
                                                       
10 A second measure, designed to capture the idiosyncratic return volatility, provided similar results and is
omitted from the empirical section of the paper.15
Following Bhushan (1989), industry differences are controlled for by classifying the
sample firms in six industry groups based on the firm’s primary SIC code. The selected industry
groups (two-digit SIC codes in parentheses) are mining (10-14), construction and manufacturing
(15-39), transportation, communication and other public utilities (40-49), wholesale and retail
trade (50-59), finance, insurance and real estate (60-67), and services (70-96). Five dummy
variables are used, so the effect of the sixth industry group is captured in the intercept term.
LSHARES is the log of the number of firm's shares outstanding. LNINST is the log of the
number of institutions holding the firm's stock. The variable PERINSD denotes the total
percentage of shares owned by insiders.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. For each variable, we report the
mean, median, standard deviation, twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles, and maximum
values.
The sample firms are followed by an average of 10.5 analysts, with a maximum following
of 41. The average market value of the equity of a sample firm is $2,562 million while the median
market value is $534 million, suggesting that the distribution of asset values is not symmetric. On
average, the sample firms have 2.9 four-digit SIC codes.
The mean (median) insider holdings in a firm are 17 percent (8.4 percent). One-fourth of
the sample firms display insider holdings of more than 25.9 percent. The median values of the
insider ownership variables are considerably lower than the mean values, suggesting that the
distribution of holdings reflect, in part, a small number of insiders with very large positions. On
average, a sample firm has 2.8 noninsider blockholders. The average holdings of noninsider
blockholders are 21.5 percent. In a quarter of the sample firms noninsider blockholders own
more than 31.6 percent of the firm.16
4. Empirical results
4.1 Correlation structure
  We first examine the correlation structure among the variables. Table 3 presents the
correlation matrix for selected independent variables. First, we note that all variables, except
leverage and the Herfindahl index of institutional holdings, are strongly correlated with the size of
the firm. Specifically, the total variance of firm returns is negatively correlated with size, while the
degree of correlation between firm and market returns is positively correlated with size. As
expected, the correlation coefficients indicate that larger firms tend to be more diversified, have
more shares outstanding, and have a greater number of institutional investors.
The concentration of ownership by insiders is negatively correlated with the size of firm
and the degree of correlation between firm and market returns, and positively correlated with the
variability of firm returns. These results are consistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn
(1985). They study a sample of 511 firms for 1980, and find that ownership tends to be less
concentrated in larger firms, and more concentrated in firms with higher control potential; that is,
in firms with noisier environments. The number and percentage of noninsider blockholders are
also negatively correlated with the size of firm and the degree of correlation between firm and
market returns, and positively correlated with the variability of firm returns.
The number of institutions with holdings in a firm is positively correlated with size and the
degree of correlation between firm and market returns, and is negatively correlated with the
variability of firm returns. This result supports other findings, by Badrinath, Gay, and Kale (1989),
that institutions prefer to invest in larger firms and tend to avoid firms with higher volatility. The
number of institutional investors is also positively correlated with the number of four digit SIC
codes and the number of shares outstanding.17
4.2 Concentrated ownership and analyst following: Regression Based Tests
We use, despite some debate in the literature regarding the endogeniety of holdings, a
simple OLS based framework in order to investigate the effects of ownership variables on
analyst following.
11 We report the results of the OLS regression of analyst following on the
concentration of ownership in Table 4.
12 Columns 1 and 2 report the results that include
concentration measures for both insiders and institutional investors as calculated using
Herfindahl indices. We focus on institutions here because of data availability and the fact that
institutions are by far and away the largest group of concentrated shareholders other than the
management of the firm. The results support the idea that increased concentration, by either
insiders or outsiders, results in a lower number of analysts following the firm.
13 Consistent with
our hypothesis that concentration and average percentages exert independent influences on
analyst following, we find that, as documented in earlier studies, analyst following decreases with
an increase in percentage of insider ownership, whereas it increases with an increase in the
number of institutional investors holding shares in the firm.
Columns 3 and 4 show that, as hypothesized, the coefficient of concentration of outside
ownership is negative and statistically significant, whether measured as the percentage held or
number of outside blockholders. This negative relationship between analyst following and
concentration of outside shareholdings supports our argument that when outside ownership is
concentrated, in house analysis or other sources of information substitute for the services of
outside analysts. Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that our hypothesis concerning
                                                       
11 An alternative is to use a simultaneous equations approach such as that employed by O’Brien and
Bhushan (1991). However, as argued by McNichols (1991), there are econometric and theoretical
concerns in using this approach for analyst following and institutional ownership.
12 Since past studies have produced mixed results regarding the effect of variability of firm returns on
analyst following, we run the regressions using two different proxies for the variability of firm returns.
Qualitatively, the results are independent of the proxy used.
13 We also run the regressions by replacing the Herfindahl indices with the percentage of the firm held by
the institutions and the insiders with the largest shareholdings in the firm. Specifically, we examine top one
as well as top five institutions and insiders. As expected, we find fewer analysts following firms in which the
maximal institutional and insider holdings are high. We do not provide these results for the sake of brevity.18
the relationship between the concentration of holdings and the number of analysts following a
given firm is not inconsistent with these data.
4.3 Control variables
In Table 4, all the control variables have the hypothesized signs. There is a greater
analyst following for larger firms. This is consistent with the argument that the demand for
information is higher for larger firms.
14 Analyst following declines as leverage increases,
suggesting that the monitoring activities of debt holders lead to a reduced need for external
information.
We also find that analyst following is higher for firms with higher than average variability
of returns. The interpretation of this relationship is that the higher value of information concerning
firms with greater return variability more than offsets the higher costs of information production.
The results also indicate that fewer analysts follow firms whose returns have a low correlation
with our proxy for the market, supporting the argument that information acquisition costs are
higher for such firms. The coefficient on the number of four-digit SIC codes is negative and
statistically significant, reflecting the greater difficulty and increased costs associated with
information acquisition for diversified firms. As expected, we find analyst following to be
positively related with the number of shares outstanding.
5. Concluding comments
In this paper we argue that when the holdings in a firm are concentrated, there is less
need for the production of outside information. We empirically test this argument by examining
the effect of concentration of shareholdings, on the part of both insiders and outsiders, on the
                                                       
14 In an earlier version of the paper, we also examine the dispersion of analyst opinion. We use the
coefficient of variation of analyst forecast as the proxy for dispersion, and find that dispersion is less for
larger firms. This may reflect the greater availability of public information for larger firms. We also find
higher dispersion for firms with a higher variability of returns. We do not find any relation between
dispersion and institutional ownership variables, and therefore exclude the analysis of dispersion from this
version of the paper.19
number of analysts following the firm. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a negative
relationship between analyst following and concentration of ownership. Moreover, we find that
these results are robust across a number of different proxies for concentration.
Thus, this paper provides strong and consistent empirical support for the argument that
outsiders with concentrated holdings are likely to substitute for other sources of information by
providing their own in-house analysis. Since most of the concentrated ownership positions in our
sample are those held by institutions, one can view these results as helping to refine Bhushan’s
(1989) conclusion that institutions do not perform in-house analysis that can substitute for the
services of outside analysts. Moreover, we also find that concentrated holdings by insiders are
associated with lower analyst following, a result consistent with the signaling theory of LeLand
and Pyle (1977) as well as the theory of moral hazard between insiders and outsiders discussed
by Jensen and Meckling (1976).
In this paper, we distinguish only between inside and outside shareholders and those
with concentrated holdings vs. those with diffuse holdings. However, while some outside
shareholders may use information primarily for monitoring of management, some may need
information only for trading, while others may be entirely passive investors. A finer classification
scheme of outside shareholders might reveal some interesting results, and we leave that
investigation for future work.20
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          Table 1
    Sample selection procedure
Number of firms on Disclosure and I/B/E/S databases, with financial
year ending on December 31, and followed by at least one analyst
2,683
Subtract:
Firms followed by only one analyst
Firms with missing values for one or more control variables
Firms with missing details of ownership
Firms not available on CRSP tapes, or some ambiguity
Firms with one or more days of data missing on CRSP tapes
455
   700






Panel A: Dependent variable and control variables
NAL is the number of analysts that follow a firm. MVE is the size of the firm, measured by the
market value of firm's equity in $ million. DEBT is the ratio of long term debt to equity. The
variability of the return of a firm is measured by two alternate proxies. RETVAR is the variance
of the daily total returns, and RESVAR is the variance of the daily idiosyncratic returns. RSQ is
the correlation between firm and market returns as measured by the coefficient of
determination of the OLS regression of the daily firm return on the daily return on the value-
weighted market portfolio. CODES is the number of four-digit SIC codes corresponding to the
firm. SHARES is the number of shares outstanding. NINST is the number of institutions
holding the firm's stock. PERINSD denotes the total percentage of firm owned by insiders.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3  Max.
NAL   10.47 8.00 8.45 4.00  14.00    41.00
MVE * 10
-3   2.56 0.53 7.32 0.17  1.79    98.40
DEBT   0.56 0.45 4.48 0.14  0.88    34.95
RETVAR * 10
3   0.67 0.42 0.68 0.22  0.87      4.69
RESVAR * 10
3   0.63 0.39 0.67 0.20  0.82      4.69
RSQ   0.08 0.06 0.07 0.02  0.12      0.43
CODES   2.87 2.00 1.80 2.00  4.00      7.00
SHARES * 10
-3   66.37   26.05  134.22 11.98   64.46   1696.56
NINST 129.64 82.00  140.15 39.00 159.50  888.00
PERINSD  16.98 8.38 20.62  1.49 25.93   99.9924
Table 2 (continued)
Panel B: Industry-wise distribution of sample firms
Industry Firms Industry Firms
Mining   83 Wholesale & retail trade   92




Panel C: Ownership concentration variables
HI-INST and HI-INSD are the Herfindahl index of institutional and insider ownership
concentration, respectively. They are calculated by summing the squared percentage of
shares controlled by the five institutions and the five insiders, respectively, with the largest
holdings in the firm. PERBLOCK is the total percentage of firm owned by the noninsider 5-
percent blockholders of the firm. NUMBLOCK is the number of the noninsider 5-percent
blockholders.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 Max.
HI-INST 156.04 101.04 283.98 45.70 187.54 6484.78
HI-INSD 308.40.   8.20 824.20 0.20 179.00 7962.60
PERBLOCK 21.47 17.15 19.23 6.64 31.57 99.99
NUMBLOCK 2.80 2.00 2.21 1.00 4.00 16.0025
Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients
LMVE is the log of the market value of firm's equity in $ million. DEBT is the ratio of long term debt to equity. RETVAR is the variance of
the daily total returns. RSQ is the correlation between firm and market returns as measured by the coefficient of determination of the
OLS regression of the daily firm return on the daily return on the value-weighted market portfolio. CODES is the number of four-digit SIC
codes corresponding to the firm. LSHARES is the log of number of shares outstanding. LNINST is the log of the number of institutions
holding the firm's stock. PERINSD denotes the total percentage of firm owned by insiders. PERBLOCK is the total percentage of firm
owned by the noninsider 5-percent blockholders of the firm. NUMBLOCK is the number of the noninsider 5-percent blockholders. HI-
INST and HI-INSD are the Herfindahl index of institutional and insider ownership concentration, respectively. They are calculated by
summing the squared percentage of shares controlled by the five institutions and the five insiders, respectively, with the largest holdings
in the firm.
Variable LMVE DEBT RETVAR RSQ CODES LSHARES LNINST PERINSD PERBLOCK NUMBLOCK HI-INST
DEBT -0.00
RETVAR -0.58 -0.05
RSQ 0.68 0.02 -0.38
CODES 0.50 0.02 -0.35 0.32
LSHARES 0.92 -0.01 -0.41 0.61 0.44
LNINST 0.93 -0.02 -0.57 0.69 0.48 0.85
PERINSD -0.33 0.01 0.31 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28 -0.40
PERBLOCK -0.20 0.03 0.17 -0.17 -0.12 -0.18 -0.17 -0.03
NUMBLOC
K
-0.19 0.03 0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.20 -0.09 -0.08 0.73
HI-INST -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.20 0.15
HI-INSD -0.12 0.04 0.13 -0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.22 0.60 -0.03 -0.14 -0.02
Correlation coefficients with an absolute value of more than 0.08 are two-tailed significant at the 1% level.26
Table 4
Regressions of analyst following on
concentration of shareholdings
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of analyst following (NAL) on variables representing
concentration of shareholdings and control variables. Two-digit SIC code-based industry dummy





      (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)
Intercept    -43.958
  (-20.89)***
   -43.460
  (-20.53)***
   -42.110
  (-20.25)***
   -41.449
  (-19.70)***




     -    -0.895
  (-1.79)**
   -0.903
  (-1.82)**
Herfindahl index of insider ownership
concentration  (HI-INSD) * 10
-3      -    -0.615
  (-4.56)***
   -0.375
  (-2.28)*
Percentage of firm owned by noninsider
blockholders (PERBLOCK)
     -     -0.017
   (-2.52)***
Number of noninsider blockholders
(NUMBLOCK)
     -     -0.139
   (-2.56)**
Log of market value of firm's equity in $
million (LMVE)
    +     2.041
   (6.49)***
    2.062
   (6.50)***
    1.963
   (6.41)***
    1.887
   (6.21)***
Ratio of long term debt to equity (DEBT)      -    -0.026
  (-2.16)
   -0.026
  (-2.35)
   -0.026
  (-2.22)
   -0.026
  (-2.24)
Variance of daily total returns
(RETVAR) * 10
3 + or -     1.119
   (5.04)***
    1.173
   (5.21)***
    1.233
   (5.42)***
    1.222
   (5.42)***
Correlation between firm and market
returns (RSQ)
    +    10.697
    (3.51)***
   10.620
    (3.51)***
   10.966
    (3.65)***
   11.212
    (3.73)***
Number of four-digit SIC codes (CODES) + or -    -0.264
  (-2.71)***
   -0.281
  (-2.86)***
   -0.285
  (-2.91)***
   -0.279
  (-2.84)***
Log of number of shares outstanding
(LSHARES)
    +     1.526
   (4.95)***
    1.515
   (4.95)***
    1.489
   (4.88)***
    1.455
   (4.76)***
Log of number of institutions holding the
firm's stock (LNINST)
    +     2.200
   (5.74)***
    2.113
   (5.36)***
    2.238
   (6.06)***
    2.405
   (6.61)***
Percentage of insider ownership
(PERINSD)
    -    -0.018
  (-2.37)**
   -0.029
  (-4.46)***
   -0.029
  (-4.44)***
F-value 238.42*** 223.61*** 239.36*** 239.12***
Adjusted R
2 (%)   73.85   73.94   73.93   73.91
Asterisks indicate two-tailed significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.